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Locus of Territorial Attachments

Intergroup Differences and Macrostructural Determinants of Subnational and Supranational Identities

Abstract: In this paper, we elaborate on Hooghe and Marks's (2001) conceptualization of territorial attachments. We assume that multi-identities related to the territory should reveal the locus on the continuum from local to national. On the basis of IntUne data, we build a ten-point scale, assigning high weights to multi-identity

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involving local and regional attachments and low weights to the attachments on only a national level and to the lack of territorial attachment altogether. In addition we use the measure of European identity. Our study achieves three goals: (1) it compares the strength of territorial attachment among political elites and the general population; (2) it assesses the effect of regional characteristics across countries on elites' territorial attachment; and (3) it estimates the relationship between subnational identities and European identity. We show that there is a substantial intergroup variation in territorial attachments: political elites in most of the countries reveal stronger subnational identity than the masses. Regional characteristics of countries—conceptualized in terms of self-governing features and predetermined controlled features—explain a substantive portion of the relative strength of elites' subnational identities. Subnational identities are positively related to European identities among the general populations but not among elites.

After the publication of *The Politics of Territorial Identity: Studies in European Regionalism* (Rokkan and Urwin 1984), it became apparent that the *locatedness* or *territorial locus* of identity is subject to politics and changes in time. Within each country, territorial attachments can involve local, regional, and national levels; they could appear coincidentally, or separately, or be absent. Hooghe and Marks (2001: 53–59; Marks 1999: 71–77) provided an explanation of the relationship of multi-identity, single dominant identity, and a lack of identity. They claim that the triangle formed by these concepts can be used as a framework for locating individuals' territorial identities. Indeed, they use this framework to discuss data on local, regional, and national identities.

Conceptually and methodologically, identity is a complex phenomenon. Although research on group identity and identity politics has grown exponentially in the past few decades, there is as yet no consensus on the definition of group identity or how to measure it (Abdelal et al. 2006). We do not intend to enter the debate here. Henri Tajfel's definition is a good starting point for the way we conceptualize identity. According to Tajfel, social identity is "that part of the individual's self concept which derives from his

knowledge of his membership of a social group(s) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Taifel 1981: 255; see also Herrmann and Brewer 2002).

In this article, following Hooghe and Marks (2001) and Marks’s (1999) original approach, we concentrate on the locus of territorial attachment, using IntUne data for political elites and masses. Our measure of subnational identity provides high weights to multi-identity involving local and regional attachments and low weights to the attachments on the national level only, as well as to the lack of any territorial attachment. We ask three specific questions.

The first question pertains to the strength of territorial attachment for different groups of the population, including political elites. Do political elites reveal, on average, a higher level of subnational identity than masses? If so, how is this difference distributed across nations?

Of course, one could assume that territorial attachments are to some extent determined by the individual-level variables. Among both masses and elites, people with more traditional views and experiences hold stronger subnational identities than those with more modern views and experiences. However, in this paper we attempt to go beyond individually centered explanations, and include some variables that characterize countries with respect of subnational structural environments of institutions and policies.

Thus, our second question is: To what extent can regional autonomy explain the discrepancy between elites’ and masses’ subnational identities? We pose this question since political elites are, on the one hand, under pressure from their local constituencies and, by this very fact, are likely to reveal stronger subnational identities than the general public. However, they operate in particular regional structural environments of institutions and policies, with some environments more conducive to subnational identities than others.

The third question pertains to the relationship between subnational and supranational identities. Is a strong sense of attachment to the village/region/nation compatible with a strong sense of attachment to the European Union, or are the two mutually exclusive? The literature raises two opposite expectations: (a) this relationship is positive, and (b) that the *more* one feels attached to local territory the *less* one feels attached to the European Union

(for arguments, see Carey 2002; Shabad and Slomczynski 2010; see also Cinpoes 2008; Citrin and Sides 2004; Jensen and Richardson 2005). We examine the extent to which local attachment coincides with European identity in the context of democracy, assuming that in more democratic countries the positive relationship between subnational and supranational identities is stronger than in less democratic countries. The main rationale for this assumption is that democratic countries have developed civic societies, which is conducive to expanding territorial attachments from local ones to those that cross national boundaries (Laitin 2002; Lecours 2001; Roca and Oliveira-Roca 2007).

Hypotheses

In this study, we formulate three basic hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: On average, the locus of territorial attachments is more centered toward subnational identities in the case of political elites than in the case of the general population.

Let us assume that for each country we have the same scale, Y , of subnational identity for elites and the general population. Then we expect that in most countries $MeanY_{(elites)} > MeanY_{(masses)}$. Within the same framework, the ratio variable $MeanY_{(elites)} / MeanY_{(masses)}$ would reflect the relative strength of elites' subnational identities, with values greater than 1 supporting our hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2: The relative strength of elites' subnational identities is positively determined by the self-governing features of the regional structural environments of institutions and policies, and it is negatively determined by the predetermined controlled features of the regional structural environments of institutions and policies.

What this hypothesis is saying can be rephrased as follows: Political elites reveal subnational identities depending on the likelihood of their exercising some influence on the subnational level. Exercising this influence might be facilitated by self-governing features of the regional institutions and policies, or it might be

inhibited by controlled features of regional institutions and policies. For example, parliamentarians can be attached to the town from which they originate because they view the town council as a platform for their influence, but they can lose this attachment because they view the local administration as rigid and not cooperative.

Let us assume that for each country we have adequate measures for self-governing features of the regional institutions and policies (X_1) and the predetermined controlled features of the regional institutions and policies (X_2). Then, we expect that the relationship of the form

$$\text{Mean}Y_{(\text{elites})} / \text{Mean}Y_{(\text{masses})} = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + e$$

would provide positive and statistically significant b_1 and negative and statistically significant b_2 , where a is constant e is the error term.

Hypothesis 3: Among elites and masses, the more one feels attached to the local territory the more one feels attached to the European Union, with a proviso that this positive relationship is stronger in more democratic countries than in less democratic countries. The justification for this expectation lies in Hooghe and Marks's (2001) argument about complementariness of territorial attachments and their parallel development with building a civil society. The test of this hypothesis assumes that:

$R_{(\text{Subnational identity and European Identity})} > 0$ and at least for some countries statistically significant, and for all countries included in the analysis

$R_{(\text{Subnational identity and European Identity})} = a + cD + e$ with $c > 0$ and statistically significant, where a is constant and e is the error term.

Data and Measurement

Data come from the first wave of IntUne mass and elite surveys. The project was conducted under the Sixth Framework Programme (FP6) designed to study citizenship in the context of European Union expansion (Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-Based Society, CIT3-CT-2005-513421).¹ It employed a multimethod strategy for

data gathering and analysis, made up of surveys of public opinion from elites and the general public, official documents produced by the elites, and content analysis of television and newspaper news and reports.² In this study we explore only one kind of data, those from surveys among both elites and the general public. We restrict our analyses to the countries in which both surveys were conducted: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom. From the elite survey, we extracted only the political elite—parliamentarians.

Table 1 provides the basic information on the frequency of very strong attachments to the village/town, region, and country. We used these data to produce a scale for subnational identity. In constructing this scale, we assumed that local identity should be weighted higher than regional identity to reflect a narrower locus of territorial attachment. We also assumed that the subnational identity is stronger in the presence of national identity than in its absence. After experimenting with various weight structures for the variables involved, we have chosen a very simple one: local identity is weighted by 5, regional identity is weighted by 3, and national identity—as a benchmark—is weighted by 1. Thus, the scale runs from 0 (no territorial identity) to 9 (all very strong identities), with all values clearly identifying the locus of territorial attachment. Value 1 denotes very strong national identity alone, value 3—very strong regional identity alone, and value 4—a combination of both. Values higher than 4 are reserved for local identity: very strong local identity alone receives 5 points, while its combination with very strong national identity—6 points, and with very strong regional identity—8 points. Local identity strengthened by regional identity and national identity receives the maximum number of points, 9).

The distribution of this variable in the whole samples is as follows: $MeanY_{(elites)} = 5.87$, Standard Deviation $Y_{(elites)} = 3.35$, $MeanY_{(masses)} = 4.66$, Standard Deviation $Y_{(masses)} = 3.90$. Figures 1 and 2 show the cumulative distribution of this variable for the total samples, and Figures 3 and 4 show the mean values and standard deviations of this variable for individual countries.

Table 1

Proportion of Elites and Masses with Very Strong Attachment to Local, Regional, and National Locus in Fifteen Countries

	Attachment of elites			Attachment of masses		
	Local	Regional	National	Local	Regional	National
Austria	0.687	0.617	0.716	0.616	0.641	0.727
Belgium	0.625	0.387	0.300	0.410	0.378	0.369
Bulgaria	0.617	0.457	0.855	0.707	0.660	0.776
Denmark	0.700	0.317	0.867	0.509	0.213	0.723
Estonia	0.718	0.486	0.775	0.495	0.397	0.681
France	0.787	0.443	0.875	0.430	0.407	0.552
Germany	0.628	0.556	0.654	0.583	0.497	0.526
Greece	0.793	0.773	0.820	0.488	0.470	0.646
Hungary	0.937	0.500	0.937	0.631	0.571	0.764
Italy	0.695	0.506	0.774	0.530	0.473	0.622
Poland	0.837	0.887	0.962	0.539	0.510	0.681
Portugal	0.709	0.612	0.925	0.572	0.570	0.693
Serbia	0.538	0.319	0.582	0.576	0.455	0.608
Slovakia	0.662	0.450	0.775	0.505	0.339	0.406
Spain	0.687	0.660	0.677	0.434	0.352	0.391
United Kingdom	0.625	0.460	0.300	0.406	0.354	0.432

Source: IntUne data.

Results

Subnational Identity Among Members of Elites and the General Population

Table 2 shows that in most cases H1 is supported: In most countries the mean value of the subnational identity scale is significantly higher for elites than for the general population. In four countries the difference is larger than two points (Portugal, the United Kingdom, France, Italy), and in seven countries it is between one and two points (Spain, Serbia, Hungary, Estonia, Greece, Denmark, Belgium); in only one country is the difference contrary to expectation—negative (Bulgaria).

Figure 1. Cumulative Distribution of the Scale of Subnational Identity Among Elites: IntUne Data




Figure 2. Cumulative Distribution of the Scale of Subnational Identity Among Masses: IntUne Data




Figure 3. Mean Value of the Scale of Subnational Identity Among Elites: IntUne Data




Figure 4. Mean Value of the Scale of Subnational Identity Among the Population: IntUne Data




Table 2

Scale of Subnational Identity for Elites and Masses for Fifteen Countries


	Subnational identity		Difference between elite and masses	Ratio for elites and masses
	Elite	Masses		
	Mean value of the scale			
Austria	5.987	5.730	0.257	1.045
Belgium	4.587	3.570	1.017	1.285
Bulgaria	5.272	6.290	-1.018	0.838
Denmark	5.317	3.910	1.407	1.360
Estonia	5.803	4.350	1.453	1.334
France	6.125	3.920	2.205	1.562
Germany	5.372	4.930	0.444	1.090
Greece	5.918	4.500	1.418	1.315
Hungary	7.103	5.630	1.473	1.262
Italy	7.139	4.690	2.449	1.522
Poland	5.342	4.910	0.432	1.088
Portugal	7.812	5.260	2.552	1.485
Slovakia	4.130	3.950	0.180	1.045
Spain	5.437	3.620	1.817	1.502
United Kingdom	6.032	3.520	2.512	1.714

Source: IntUne data.

These differences are largely reflected in the ratio presented in the last column of Table 2. This ratio shows the relative strength of subnational identity of the political elite, taking into account the value of the scale in the general population. This ratio for all countries is in Figure 5. The results can be summarized as follows.

Taking as a benchmark the total mean value of the relative elites' subnational identity, we can distinguish three clearly differentiated groups of countries. In the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal the values of the variable are high (at least half a standard deviation above the mean), while in Bulgaria, Slovakia,

Figure 5. Relative Strength of Subnational Identity Among Elites by Country: IntUne Data



Austria, Germany, and Poland the values are low (at least half a standard deviation below the mean); Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Estonia, and Serbia are in-between (close to the mean).

Determinants of Subnational Attachments

In order to test H2, we develop measures for self-governing features of the regional institutions and policies (X_1) and the predetermined controlled features of the regional institutions and policies (X_2). These measures are based on the indicators provided by Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel (2008). Self-control means the institutional depth of local authorities, a large scope of policies, fiscal autonomy, clear representation of diversified groups, decisions undertaken by assembly, effective executive, and self-rule. In contrast, the predetermined controlled features of the regional institutions and policies involve stringent control not only over rules (lawmaking) and conduct of local authorities (shared rule) but also a decision process by the executive body (executive control) and its fiscal policies (fiscal control), with a possibility of changing fundamental norms (constitutional reform). Information on constructs is in Table 3.

Table 4 reveals strong support for H2. Indeed, self-governing features of the regional institutions and policies significantly enhance the subnational identity of elites. In contrast, the effect of predetermined controlled features of the regional institutions and policies is negative, and also statistically significant ($p < .05$). Both independent variables explain over one-fifth of the variance of the relative strength of elites' subnational identity.

Since our analyses are based on only sixteen cases (countries), the results might potentially be prone to the effect of some extreme values of the variables involved. We checked the scatter plots and ran sensitivity statistical analyses. The results seem to be robust. Moreover, as one can see in Figure 6, the predicted values group the countries in interpretable terms although some countries' specific location needs further investigation. In particular, the predicted values for the United Kingdom and Portugal are much smaller

Table 3

Mean Values, Standard Deviations and Factor Loadings for Indicators of the Two Dimensions of Regional Autonomy: Self-Governance and Control

Indicators	Mean value	Standard deviation	Factor loading ^a	
			Self-governance ^b	Control ^c
Institutional depth	3.069	1.541	0.968	0.0
Policy scope	2.5129	1.700	0.967	0.0
Fiscal autonomy	1.8259	1.825	0.851	0.0
Representation	4.144	2.399	0.970	0.0
Assembly	2.325	1.287	0.935	0.0
Executive	1.819	1.201	0.936	0.0
Self-rule	11.556	7.035	0.996	0.0
Law making	0.494	0.777	0.0	0.964
Executive control	0.381	0.716	0.0	0.805
Fiscal control	0.519	0.808	0.0	0.974
Constitutional reform	0.712	1.175	0.0	0.889
Share rule	2.120	3.143	0.0	0.999

Source: IntUne data.

^aThe structure of factors imposed a priori 0.

^bEigenvalue = 6.28, proportion of variance = 89.7 percent.

^cEigenvalue = 4.31, proportion of variance = 86.3 percent.

Table 4


Regression of the Relative Strength of Elite's Subnational Identity on Regional Self-Governance and Regional Control Factor

	B	SE	Beta
Regional self-governance	0.165	0.070	0.725*
Regional control	-0.158	0.052	-0.681*
Constant	1.282	0.052	—

Source: IntUne data.

* $p < 0.05$.

Figure 6. Predicted Value of the Relative Strength of Subnational Identity and Regional Self-Governance



than in reality, while the predicted value for Poland and Slovakia is much higher than in reality. The values for most of the countries are predicted within a conventional limit of half the standard deviation. For some cases, like Belgium, the prediction is almost perfect. The configuration of countries with respect to the prediction pattern can be considered in terms of structural and cultural explanations (Jensen and Richardson 2005; Lecours 2001; Roca and Oliveira-Roca 2007).

Since the correlation between our regional measures is relatively high ($r = .676$), the variance-inflation factor (VIF), that is, $1/(1 - r^2)$, is around 1.8, almost twice the standard error. Still, in our case VIF is much lower than the conventionally assumed cutoff point of 4.0. However, it would be practically impossible to add some new variables to the proposed equation: This would increase the multicollinearity and take away additional degrees of freedom. Thus, our analyses are very much limited by the number of countries represented in the IntUne data.

Subnational Attachment and European Identity

We performed correlations and regression analyses to select indicators that have the most discriminatory power in explaining attachment to Europe—a criterion variable. These analyses suggest three indicators of European Identity: sharing European cultural traditions, respecting the European Union’s laws and institutions, and feeling European.³

Table 5 presents distributional characteristics of the selected items indicating European identity and the measurement models of European identity for political elites and the general public in 2007. In both samples, the mean values of all three items are above the midpoint of the scale (3), with standard errors from 0.773 to 1.409 points. The largest difference between samples deals with feeling European: Political elites score higher in this respect than the general public. Otherwise, the means and standard deviations are similar for both samples.

The internal consistency of the measurement models—expressed in terms of eigenvalues and percent of explained variance—is very similar for political elites and the general public. In addition, the factor loadings suggest essentially the same structure of items, with *feeling European* as the most important, *sharing European cultural traditions* the least important, and *respecting the European Union’s laws and institutions* in-between. Generally, the differences between factor loadings for particular items and for particular samples are relatively small, suggesting that all items contribute almost equally to the latent constructs for political elites and the general public.

Those who score high on the introduced construct called European identity define “European” as considering *feeling European*, *sharing European cultural traditions*, and *respecting the European Union’s laws and institutions* very important. In contrast, those who score low on this construct define “European” as considering *feeling European*, *sharing European cultural traditions*, and *respecting the European Union’s laws and institutions* not at all important. Thus, we consider here a specific meaning of European identity that focuses on nonascriptive properties.

Table 5

Distributional Characteristics of Items Indicating European Identity and Their Factor Loadings for Political Elite and the General Public

Items ^a	Mean	Standard deviation	Factor loading
A0. Political elite ^b			
Sharing European cultural traditions	3.981	1.146	0.726
Respecting European Union's laws and institutions	4.364	1.042	0.761
Feeling European	4.409	0.979	0.824
B0. General public ^c			
Sharing European cultural traditions	3.773	1.212	0.754
Respecting European Union's laws and institutions	4.284	0.988	0.762
Feeling European	3.920	1.201	0.803

Source: IntUne data.

^aItems are drawn from the general question: "for being European, how important do you think each of the following is . . . to share European cultural traditions . . . to respect European Union's laws and institutions . . . to feel European? Each item was evaluated by respondents on a four-point scale from (1) very important to (4) not at all important, with spontaneous ambivalent answers coded as (5). We recoded this scale to five points: from (1) not at all important, (2) not important, (3) for ambivalent answers, (4) important, (5) very important.

^bFor the measurement model, eigenvalue = 1.785, proportion of explained variance = 59.50 percent.

^cFor the measurement model, eigenvalue = 1.794, proportion of explained variance = 59.80 percent.

To test intercountry measurement equivalency, we applied factor analysis to all countries together as well as to each one separately. For each individual (respondent) we saved the values of the construct for a universal measure, and for a country-specific measure. Next, we computed the correlation coefficient between the universal measure and the country measure. In no country was the value of this coefficient lower than 0.9. This proves that the country idiosyncratic tendencies in trust in European institutions are negligible. It is justifiable to use the common construct, measuring it in the same metric for all countries.

To get a sense of how respondents—the political elites as well as the general public—score on European identity, Table 6 presents the means and the standard deviations for the scale of European identity (expressed in standardized units) for the countries in the IntUne data set. We find that political elites in most of postcommunist Europe exhibit, on average, higher European identity than the elites in the pooled data. Notable exceptions are the Czech Republic and Lithuania, two countries for which, unfortunately, there is no corresponding information for the general public. Political elites in some of the main established democracies of Europe, on the other hand, display a lower average score for European identity, and greater variation in responses, compared to the general mean and standard deviation. Germany, Denmark, and the UK are illustrative in this regard.

In all countries, among parliamentarians the correlation between subnational and European identities is sometimes positive, sometimes negative but always not statistically significant ($-0.093 \leq r \leq 0.051$). Thus, the hypothesis in its part related to elites is not supported. However, in the case of the general public, the correlations are all positive, ranging from 0.035 to 0.212. Low and insignificant correlations, $r \leq 0.085$ are in Greece, Great Britain, Estonia, Poland, and Hungary. The highest correlations, $0.136 \leq r \leq 0.212$ are in Denmark, France, Germany, Austria, and Portugal. In the remaining set of countries—Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy, and Slovakia—the correlations range from 0.095 to 0.120.

Is there a relationship between these correlations and the location of countries in the dimension of democracy? To answer this question, we use the Democracy Index, commonly known as the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Index (see Kekic 2007), based on a meticulous analysis of sixty variables grouped into five categories: (a) election protocols and political pluralism, (b) citizens' rights, (c) functioning of governmental institutions, (d) participation in political life, and (e) elements of political culture.⁴ Each of these categories has been represented on a ten-point scale and the resulting general index is an arithmetic mean of the country scores on the subscales. From the set of EIU values we have cho-

Table 6

Means and Standard Deviations of the Scale of European Identity for Political Elite and the General Public, by Country

	Political elite		General public	
	Mean	Standard deviation	Mean	Standard deviation
Austria	-0.176	0.785	0.119	10.038
Belgium	-0.104	0.786	-0.117	0.991
Bulgaria	0.441	0.697	0.309	0.893
Denmark	-0.274	0.969	-0.055	0.917
Estonia	0.235	0.677	0.071	0.995
France	0.195	0.846	-0.156	0.988
Germany	-0.600	0.207	-0.163	0.984
United Kingdom	-0.214	0.920	-0.532	0.175
Greece	0.222	0.837	-0.321	0.103
Hungary	0.249	0.560	0.342	0.880
Italy	0.259	0.714	0.276	0.773
Poland	0.246	0.606	0.035	0.856
Portugal	0.209	0.756	0.225	0.904
Slovakia	0.283	0.683	-0.096	0.959
Spain	0.134	0.695	-0.124	0.018

Source: IntUne data.


sen those corresponding to the EU countries that are part of the IntUne project.

Figure 7 shows that, by and large, if countries are located higher on the scale of democracy, the relationship between subnational and European identities is closer. The pattern is clear and it can be described by the regression line for predicted values

$$R_{(\text{Subnational identity and European identity})} = -0.271 + 0.048D,$$

where the standard error for the coefficient for D (EIU Index) is 0.017 ($p < 0.02$), and the proportion of explained variance is 32.1 percent. Thus, we can claim that for the masses H3 holds.

Figure 7. Democracy Index and the Correlation Between Subnational and European Identity



Conclusion and Discussion

In this study we stated three hypotheses. H1 says that, on average, the locus of territorial attachments is more centered toward subnational identities in the case of political elites than in the case of general population. H2 postulates that the relative strength of elites' subnational identities is positively determined by the self-governing features of the regional structural environments of institutions and policies, and it is negatively determined by the predetermined controlled features of the regional structural environments of institutions and policies. The IntUne data support both expectations. However, H3—that there is a clear relation between subnational and European identities embedded in the political regime—held only for the masses. We did not find empirical support for elites.

The weak and significant effects reported in this study reflect the nature of the majority of sociological regularities involving territorial identities. A relatively strong effect on people's European identities is exercised by subnational identity, but mainly in countries with long democratic traditions. We assume that local identity is more deeply rooted in people's minds than European identity and that the former affects the latter. However, in the longer run we cannot exclude that the relationship is reciprocal.

People's identities and democratic institutions are related to each other in a dynamic fashion. Democracy as a macro variable not only affects identities but also depends on them. As the literature indicates, democracy in the EU could not develop if people did not identify with this supranational entity and lacked trust in its basic institutions (see Westle 2007 and works cited in it; see also Slomczynski and Tomescu-Dubrow 2010). The argument that identity forms the "glue" holding together a political community and legitimizing democratic decisions and thus "fosters the functioning and persistence of democracy" (Gaber 2006: 35) could apply not only to countries but to the EU as a whole. In this context, it is important to recognize that identities—both subnational and supranational—are also determined by macro factors, including the level of democracy in the EU member countries.

Notes

1. The project has been coordinated by the University of Siena, Italy, and is composed of several collaborating institutions from across Europe. Maurizio Cotta has served as project coordinator, Pierangelo Isernia as project deputy coordinator, Elisabetta De Giorgi as project manager.

2. The IntUne project involves, directly and indirectly, research questions designed to reveal the dynamics of European integration, focusing on the “formative attitudes” toward further advancement of the unification process of an “Ever Closer Europe.” This raises the question: Is there, among the elites, or among the masses, a substantial potential for integration? The idea is that this potential that could be revealed and estimated influenced the content of the interview questionnaires, as the project planners devoted a number of items to national and European identity, trust in national and European institutions, and prospects for further integration.

3. To provide a contrast in the approach to measurement, we refer to Michael Bruter’s (2005) study on European identity. Bruter focuses on “political identity,” defined primarily by “symbols” or markers such as the euro, the European passport (issued by an EU member country and signed by EU authorities), the European flag and anthem, and finally, a positive attitude toward Europe Day. The selection of these symbols is meant to closely link political identity to the daily experience of ordinary people. The conclusion of Bruter’s study is straightforward: European identity is already in existence. People identify with the European Union as a system of relevant institutions, which refer to rights, obligations, and freedoms.

4. The differences among all IntUne countries according to the EIU Democracy Index (see Kekic 2007) and two other indexes of democracy—Demos Everyday Democracy Index (Skidmore and Bound 2008), and Democracy, Markets, and Transparency Index (Salvia and Alberro 2007)—is negligible and it does not affect our conclusions.

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