

AINA GALLEGO

Unequal Political Participation in Europe

ABSTRACT: The fact that social stratification factors are closely related to different levels of political participation is a classical issue that has relevant normative as well as explanatory implications for the study of participation. Research on this topic has focused mainly on unequal participation in the United States and we know little about contemporary patterns in other contexts. This article uses data from the European Social Survey to explore the effect of various possible sources of inequality (gender, age, social class, education, income, ethnicity, and working status) on four political activities: voting, working with parties and action groups, attending demonstrations, and boycotting products. Overall, age, education, and social class emerge as the most common causes of distortion, while gender, membership in minorities, and occupational variables are less clearly related to participation. In conventional political activities the differences are more predictable in the direction of the disadvantaged, while demonstrators are in some respects undistinguishable from the general public. Finally, the fact that socioeconomic inequalities in turnout are unambiguously visible in most European countries stands in contrast to past research and deserves further attention.

Various aspects related to the social position of individuals, such as education, gender, or age, are present in any standard model for explaining political participation. The

Aina Gallego is a Ph.D. candidate at the Institut de Govern i Polítiques Públiques, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Edifici B-Campus UAB 08193, Bellaterra, Spain; e-mail: aina.gallego@uab.es.

The author thanks participants in the workshop on “Forms of Political Participation” held in Nicosia in April 2006, Eva Anduiza, Russell Dalton, Joshua Dubrow, and the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on early drafts of this article. This work was supported by the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

fact that those from advantaged backgrounds participate to a larger extent in politics is indeed one of the most consistent findings of empirical research (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Dalton 2002; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Parry, Moyser, and Day 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Biases in participation are particularly sharp in the United States and this fact has recently attracted much scholarly attention in this context. Three presidential addresses to the American Political Science Association (APSA) have dealt with this issue in recent years (Lijphart 1997; Skocpol 2004; Verba 1996), and a special APSA task force was established to investigate the link between inequality and American democracy (Jacobs and Skocpol 2005). However, the differences attributable to social stratification factors can vary between countries or depending on the political activity we focus on. Some social stratification factors might consistently depress participation while others might be of no importance in regard to some activities or in certain contexts.

The European case offers another setting in which to investigate current patterns of unequal participation. This article examines which characteristics related to individuals' social position influence levels of political participation in Europe today. The main question addressed is whether there are gaps in the participation rates of different population groups. The second aim is to assess critically which differences are consistent and pervasive enough to be considered as inequalities in political participation. Further, the article focuses on four different modes of political action (electoral, conventional, protest, and consumerism) and inquires whether the biases follow general patterns, or, conversely, whether there are mode-specific features in some cases.

Inequality in Political Participation and Its Main Sources

In comparison to the more frequent concept of political inequality, the terms "participatory inequality" (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 1999) or "inequality in political participation" are more specific and limited. Political inequality may comprise such phenomena as legal discrimination and limitation of citizenship rights, but inequality in political participation refers more precisely to the fact that, while in legal and formal terms political equality is guaranteed, the effective use of the right to take part in politics is stratified in a way that closely corresponds to lines of social stratification such as gender, education, or income. Systematic inequalities in political participation have potentially worrisome consequences for democracy. They might bias the political process in favor of those who are better situated, thus creating a vicious circle where political and social inequalities reinforce each other (Verba 2004).

With respect to individuals' social position, many dimensions frequently encountered in the literature on participation can be considered sources of inequality. Patterns of social and participatory inequality tend to overlap. The most frequently analyzed are education, income, social class, gender, and age. The common logic underpinning many explanations of their effects is resource- and cost-based: socioeconomic and

sociodemographic characteristics affect the acquisition of resources that lower the costs of taking part in politics (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Parry, Moyser, and Day 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Dimensions of social inequality reinforce each other. For example, people with more years of educational training have better-paid jobs, and ethnic minorities have fewer educational opportunities. The structural factors that can affect participation are intertwined in a variety of ways. Therefore, any analysis of the impact of social stratification factors must consider both direct and indirect relationships (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996).

A number of recent studies point out that parallel to societal transformations, much has changed since the seminal studies of Verba, Kim and Nie (1978) or Barnes and Kaase (1979) established that in Europe the socioeconomic biases for turnout and conventional participation were limited—because of the mobilization exerted by left-wing parties and trade unions over the working class—but important with regard to gender, or that participation in protest activities was mainly biased by gender, age, and education.

First, it has repeatedly been found that the gender gap has been closing or even reversing for most political activities, including turnout, protest, or new forms of participation such as political consumerism (Dalton 2002; Micheletti, Follesdal, and Stolle 2004). However, this does not hold for some conventional activities. Second, educational attainment is the most widespread socioeconomic source of inequality in participation. Although in the past educational biases in turnout have been limited or nonexistent in Europe (Norris 2002; Oppenhuis 1995; Topf 1995a), recent research has shown that such biases are becoming relevant for this form of participation, which has traditionally been considered the most egalitarian (Caul 2005). Third, in recent decades some authors have claimed that class no longer retains its capacity to shape politics (Clark and Lipset 1991, 2001; Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995).

Another line of research has focused on differences among the modes of participation, stating that there are divergent patterns depending on the activity we focus on. On the one hand, it has recently been shown that demonstrators today are more representative of the population than they used to be, even if education and age still play a role in this respect (Norris, Walgrave, and van Aelst 2005; van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). New forms of political participation, which typically imply lower costs and more options to shift in and out, might have the potential to include previously excluded groups such as women or young people. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between different forms of participation, which can be expected to follow dissimilar patterns.

Finally, certain factors have been widely studied in the American context but not in Europe. First, ethnicity and not having citizenship in one's country of residence can have an impact on participation.¹ Leaving aside legal barriers to voting, we can expect both positive and negative effects on nonelectoral political participation. In general, small groups face the risk of political marginalization because of their low levels of political interest, identification with political institutions, language

proficiency, social capital, and socioeconomic status (Diehl and Blohm 2001; Jacobs and Tillie 2004). However, some specific political processes mobilize on an ethnic basis and foster participation among otherwise disadvantaged populations (Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989). Second, we do not know whether or not the employment situation is a source of disadvantage in Europe as it is in the United States (Rosenstone 1982; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). The current labor market situation stands in contrast to that of the so-called full-employment society. Unemployment and forms of employment contracts that differ from the unlimited contract have grown in importance. Job temporality creates a horizontal segmentation of the labor market, with dissimilar working and wage conditions for similar jobs (Polavieja 2003). Unemployment and temporality can be sources of participatory inequality or affect the kind of participatory action used. According to relative deprivation approaches (Gurr 1970), dissatisfaction with one's own employment situation can lead to political radicalization or to a withdrawal of political activity due to political frustration and apathy as well as a low sense of political efficacy.

Data and Method

The European Social Survey is particularly well suited to analyzing unequal participation in Europe because it was undertaken in a large number of countries and it assures high quality in terms of data collection as well as good standards of comparability (Stoop, Jowell, and Mohler 2002). The second wave was undertaken in 2004 and covered twenty-four countries.²

Social stratification factors are intertwined, but the correlation between them is not large enough to originate multicollinearity in multivariate analysis.³ The analysis applied consists of both zero-order and partial coefficients of logistic regression analysis. Country data are pooled in one data set and are weighted according to their population. Thus, the coefficients can be interpreted in a meaningful way as average participation rates in Europe and average gaps due to sociodemographic and socioeconomic characteristics.⁴ The bivariate relationships capture the size of the gaps in the activity rates of different social groups. However, some of the biases might be spurious. For example, the gaps between men and women are partially attributable to differences in occupational status and educational background (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). Therefore, we are also interested in the partial effects of each variable of interest, that is, those that persist even when we control for other structural variables. Logistic regression coefficients are not intuitive and thus the tables also report the predicted change in the probability of participation. For a dummy variable, their interpretation is the change in the predicted probability of being active when one characteristic is present. For the linear interval variables (education and income), the interpretation is the predicted change in the probability of participation for each unit increase in the value of the independent variable. When age displays a curvilinear shape, the changes must be calculated for each year.

Operationalization of the Variables

Following the logic underpinning much research on political participation, this article relies on the hypothesis that there are underlying modes of political participation (Parry, Moysen, and Day 1993; Verba and Nie 1972). Four political activities which are commonly considered as representative of four different modes of participation will be analyzed.⁵ Beyond voting, three nonelectoral activities are chosen: working for a political party or a citizen action group is taken as a typical, conventional activity; attending peaceful demonstrations as a proxy for political protest; and having boycotted products for ethical, political, or environmental reasons is taken as an act of political consumerism. Voting is measured as having voted in the previous general elections while respondents were asked about participation in other actions during the twelve months prior to the interview. Table 1 reports the level of participation in the countries under examination.

The possible sources of inequality observed are as follows. Gender and age are classical sociodemographic variables. To model age, both a variable "age in years" and "age squared" are introduced in the analysis. This strategy acknowledges the fact that participation generally demonstrates a curvilinear pattern: it increases with age, reaches a ceiling, and decreases near the end of the life cycle. The only exception is in the case of demonstration where a declining linear pattern is most common. Education is coded as an interval variable from six or fewer years of full-time attendance to twenty or more years. Income comprehends seven bands of €500. The Goldthorpe class schema has been applied to observe the influence of the household's social class.⁶ It is reduced to five dummy variables: owners, service class, nonmanual workers, skilled manual workers, and manual unskilled workers. The latter group is the reference category; thus, the coefficients capture differences in the participation rates of each group with respect to unskilled workers. Being a member of an ethnic minority or being a citizen of a country other than advanced industrial democracies has been coded as a dummy variable. The reference category is citizens of the country of residence who are not members of ethnic minorities. Finally, four dummy variables correspond to workers who have an unlimited contract, a limited contract, are unemployed, or in any other situation. Workers with an unlimited contract constitute the reference category.

Results

Inequalities in Electoral Turnout

As was pointed out, it has long been assumed that, unlike in the United States, socioeconomic factors have little or no effect on turnout in Europe (Norris 2002; Oppenhuis 1995; Topf 1995a). As noted by Verba, Kim, and Nie (1978), this is likely due to the class-based group mobilization exerted by left-wing parties and trade unions. However, recent evidence has shown that some European democracies

Table 1

Reported Participation in Four Political Activities

	Vote*	Work for party	Demonstration	Boycott	N range
Austria	83	11	6	21	1,861–2,008
Belgium	93	4	6	10	1,598–1,668
Czech Republic	57	3	3	7	2,694–2,752
Denmark	94	5	4	29	1,322–1,350
Estonia	67	3	2	4	1,798–1,827
Finland	80	4	1	29	1,822–1,842
France	79	5	11	31	1,572–1,702
Germany	83	3	8	23	2,486–2,622
Great Britain	72	2	4	22	1,690–1,742
Greece	94	6	5	5	2,193–2,318
Hungary	81	1	2	6	1,365–1,378
Iceland	94	15	15	29	517–519
Ireland	84	5	6	11	2,093–2,104
Luxembourg	78	5	13	15	1,260–1,497
Netherlands	84	4	4	9	1,765–1,807
Norway	86	9	11	24	1,584–1,656
Poland	68	3	1	5	1,473–1,504
Portugal	74	2	3	2	1,815–1,891
Slovakia	77	3	4	11	1,313–1,341
Slovenia	70	3	2	2	1,309–1,311
Spain	85	8	34	14	1,458–1,546
Sweden	90	3	7	36	1,737–1,802
Switzerland	68	7	8	26	1,781–2,060
Ukraine	88	4	20	2	1,828–1,889
Total	80	5	7	15	40,035–42,126

Source: European Social Survey 2004.

*Valid percentage of those allowed to vote in last general election.

are approaching the sharp biases found in the United States (Caul 2005), which may be partly attributable to the lower turnout of those working class citizens who are not members of organizations. This is the first important question to examine. The data show that education has a significant positive effect on the probability of voting even while controlling for other status variables (see Table 2). With and without controls, the turnout rate rises by 1 percent with each additional year of education. The resulting gap is large because the scale contains fifteen bands. The predicted 2 percent increase for each additional income group leads to a gap of

Table 2

Personal Characteristics and the Vote

	Zero-order models		Full model (partial effects)	
	Logit coefficient	Change in predicted probability	Logit coefficient	Change in predicted probability
Woman	-0.068*	-0.011	-0.092*	-0.014
Age (years)	0.084**	0.014	0.076**	0.011
Age squared	-0.068**	-0.011	-0.050**	-0.007
Education (years, six to twenty)	0.060**	0.010	0.078**	0.012
Income (seven categories)	0.134**	0.021	0.095**	0.014
Owners	0.501**	0.071	0.269**	0.037
Service class	0.801**	0.118	0.401**	0.057
Nonmanual	0.243**	0.037	0.153**	0.022
Skilled manual	0.058	0.009	-0.016	-0.002
Temporary	-0.427**	-0.078	-0.185*	-0.029
Unemployed	-0.700**	-0.135	-0.341**	-0.055
Inactive	-0.020	-0.003	0.016	0.002
Constant			-2.296**	
Predicted probability				0.8194
N			31,261	

Source: European Social Survey 2004.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.005$.

similar size because income is coded in seven categories. However, in the multivariate analysis half of the bias is found to be spurious. On the other hand, in comparison with unskilled manual workers, the members of owners and service class households are noticeably more likely to vote, but the pattern does not hold as clearly for other social class categories.

As Lijphart (1997) points out in his critique of Topf's conclusions (1995a), a pooled analysis underestimates the effects of structural variables because countries with compulsory voting push the results downward. Taking this fact into account, we are more likely to conclude that according to the data from the European Social Survey there are sizable biases in the participation rates of different socioeconomic today.

Much research has shown that age has the most important impact on electoral turnout. Young people vote substantially less even after controlling for other fac-

tors (Anduiza 1999; Caul 2005; Dalton 2002; Oppenhuis 1995; Topf 1995a). The results effectively confirm the generalized importance of age. The significance of the age-squared variable means that the predominant pattern has a curvilinear shape, that is, middle-aged individuals vote at the highest rates. Additionally, we find once more that the gender gap has nearly vanished in Europe. The coefficients are significant—which is not surprising in a large sample—but the size of the gap (1 percent) is negligible.

Finally, U.S. research has shown that the unemployed are less likely to vote (Rosenstone 1982; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). According to our data, being unemployed constitutes a clear disadvantage in Europe, too: even after controlling for other variables, the predicted voting rate is 5.5 percent lower for the unemployed.

Inequalities in Work with Parties or Action Groups

This section analyses the effect of the structural variables on the probability of working for a political party or an action group, which is considered a typical conventional activity. Conventional nonelectoral participation has repeatedly been found to be a political activity that shows gender and age differences (Marsh and Kaase 1979; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978) and there is no clear evidence toward a reduction (Morales 2004). The results confirm the persistence of a small gender gap—a difference of approximately two percentage points in the participation rate. Age is a significant predictor and its effect has a curvilinear shape.

Previous research has shown that education also fosters activity, while income has more limited effects. Our data also confirm this (see Table 3). All else being constant, education and income increase the probability of working for political parties or action groups but the effects are very small.

For these activities, social class has a limited influence. Being a member of the owner, service, or nonmanual class increases the likelihood of working for a party when compared with unskilled manual workers' households. However, half of the bivariate effect is spurious. Once we control for other background variables the size of the expected gaps is very small (2 percentage points). According to our data, temporary workers collaborate with parties more frequently than workers with an unlimited contract. Finally, being unemployed or inactive has a spurious effect on participation, that is, the differences in the participation rates are entirely attributable to the different availability of other resources.

Inequalities in Demonstrations

The seminal study by Barnes and Kaase (1979) established that several socioeconomic and sociodemographic factors do affect participation in protest activities. Young people, highly educated, and well-off citizens were more prone to be active, while in some but not all of the countries, women were less likely to participate. In recent decades however, according to some authors these differences are not

Table 3

Personal Characteristics and Work with Parties and Action Groups

	Zero-order models		Full model (partial effects)	
	Logit coefficient	Change in predicted probability	Logit coefficient	Change in predicted probability
Woman	-0.592**	-0.026	-0.558**	-0.023
Age (years)	0.091**	0.004	0.081**	0.003
Age squared	-0.089**	-0.004	-0.070**	-0.003
Education (years, six to twenty)	0.099**	0.004	0.065**	0.003
Income (seven categories)	0.145**	0.006	0.067**	0.003
Owners	0.724**	0.040	0.552**	0.027
Service class	0.865**	0.042	0.473**	0.020
Nonmanual	0.177*	0.008	0.233**	0.010
Skilled manual	0.111	0.005	-0.037	-0.001
Temporary	0.044*	0.002	-0.336**	0.015
Unemployed	-0.294**	-0.011	-0.007	0.000
Inactive	-0.189**	-0.008	0.003	0.000
Minority or noncitizen	-0.396**	-0.015	-0.237**	-0.008
Constant			-6.243**	
Predicted probability				0.041
N			30,740	

Source: European Social Survey 2004.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.005$.

large (Norris, Walgrave, and van Aelst 2005; Topf 1995b; van Aelst and Walgrave 2001), even if important differences due to age and educational attainment persist. Therefore, these recent studies have claimed that protest has not only become a legitimized tool of political action, but its social diffusion has implied a normalization of the demonstrators' characteristics.

Interestingly, the data show that men are more likely to attend demonstrations than women but the gender gap halves when we control for other background variables (see Table 4). Young people still demonstrate more than older citizens do and education continues to be a relevant factor. While income has a significant impact in the bivariate analysis, the direct effect is very small in the multivariate one. Social class and occupational variables have almost no independent effect, but owners are less likely to demonstrate than nonskilled workers, thus reversing the habitual pattern. It is also noteworthy that members of ethnic minorities and

Table 4

Personal Characteristics and Demonstration Attendance

	Zero-order models		Full model (partial effects)	
	Logit coefficient	Change in predicted probability	Logit coefficient	Change in predicted probability
Woman	-0.161**	-0.013	-0.090*	-0.006
Age (years)	-0.022**	-0.001	-0.014**	-0.001
Education (years, six to twenty)	0.129**	0.008	0.097**	0.006
Income (seven categories)	0.102**	0.007	0.034**	0.002
Owners	-0.181*	-0.011	-0.270*	-0.015
Service class	0.468**	0.033	0.021	0.001
Nonmanual	0.133*	0.009	-0.046	-0.003
Skilled manual	-0.072	-0.005	-0.182*	-0.010
Temporary	0.057	0.004	-0.028	-0.002
Unemployed	-0.160*	-0.010	0.016	0.001
Inactive	-0.437**	-0.029	-0.013	-0.001
Minority or noncitizen	-0.064	-0.004	-0.075	-0.004
Constant			-3.173	
Predicted probability				0.065
N			32,149	

Source: European Social Survey 2004.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.005$.

noncitizens demonstrate as frequently as other citizens, and this statement holds for both the zero-order and partial effects.

Inequalities in Boycotts of Products

Research on politically motivated consumption activities has a shorter tradition than that on the other modes of political activity. Indeed, in recent decades these activities have gone from being marginal to being a fairly frequent practice (Norris 2002). As to the individual determinants of such activities, it has been found that they are fostered mostly by the level of education. Another major finding is that these are the only activities in which the gender gap has reversed its sign in many European countries (Micheletti 2003). The latter fact poses a theoretically relevant question about how to interpret gender differences. If they favor women, these differences are not to be considered as gender inequalities, but are better understood as gender-specific patterns of behavior.

Table 5

Personal Characteristics and Boycott Activity

	Zero-order models		Full model (partial effects)	
	Logit coefficient	Change in predicted probability	Logit coefficient	Change in predicted probability
Woman	-0.026	-0.003	0.054	0.006
Age (years)	0.071**	0.009	0.040**	0.005
Age squared	-0.083**	-0.010	-0.044**	-0.005
Education (years, six to twenty)	0.153**	0.018	0.098**	0.012
Income (seven categories)	0.271**	0.034	0.198**	0.024
Owners	0.499**	0.070	0.224**	0.029
Service class	1.143**	0.161	0.452**	0.057
Nonmanual	0.739	0.105	0.400**	0.053
Skilled manual	0.162*	0.021	0.050	0.006
Temporary	-0.077	-0.010	0.018	0.002
Unemployed	-0.333**	0.038	0.273**	0.036
Inactive	-0.356**	-0.046	0.209**	0.025
Minority or noncitizen	-0.291**	-0.034	-0.170*	-0.019
Constant			-4.943**	
Predicted probability				0.140
N			32,063	

Source: European Social Survey 2004.
* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.005$.

These results of previous research are partially confirmed in our analysis on engaging in boycotts (see Table 5). On the one hand, higher levels of education increase the probability of consuming for political reasons. However, women do not participate more frequently in boycotts. The aggregate nil finding is probably the result of differing patterns across countries, but on the whole the gender gap has not reversed for this activity in Europe. In addition, income has important effects, and age is also a significant variable.

Members of a service class or a nonmanual household join boycotts much more frequently than do unskilled manual workers. The participation rate of service class members is 16 percent larger than that of nonqualified manual workers, but the gap closes to 6 percent once we control for other structural variables. On the other hand, ethnic minorities have a slightly lower probability of participation. On the contrary, being unemployed or inactive has a small positive effect on participation.

Conclusions

Three questions are addressed in this article: (1) What are the most frequent sources of differences in participation in advanced societies? (2) Which of these are widespread and consistent enough to be considered inequalities? and (3) Are there mode-specific patterns?

Gender, which was once a classical source of inequality, has only a limited direct effect today. First, the gaps found when it comes to voting or attending demonstrations are very small after controlling for other variables. Second, women consume politically as often as men do. Similarly, the lower participation rates of members of ethnic minorities or noncitizens are for the most part spurious. These results suggest that, as in the United States, the political disadvantage due to gender and ethnicity in Europe is mainly attributable to the different availability of resources.

Seen from a global perspective, age, education, and social class appear to be the most powerful structural determinants of political participation. The results confirm the existence of dissimilar patterns between age groups, with a specialization of young people in protest activities, and of the middle-aged in the remaining activities. In this case, it is not obvious that age can be considered a source of inequality. Rather, we can only state that differences among age groups depending on the political activity we focus on may be due to changing preferences. People with a low educational background participate in politics consistently less frequently than their highly educated fellow citizens. Social class still has an effect in determining the levels of participation. While skilled and unskilled workers are practically indistinguishable in that regard, service and nonmanual class members vote and join boycotts more frequently and owners participate more frequently in all activities except for demonstrations.

The other dimensions observed appear to be secondary sources of inequality. All else being constant, citizens with higher income vote and boycott more frequently but income has a very weak direct influence on the other two activities observed. The effect of occupational situation is very restricted but interesting. Temporary and unemployed workers vote less frequently than workers with an unlimited contract, but when there are significant differences in regard to other activities they participate more often.

On the other hand, mode differences do exist with regard to the determinants of participation. As was stated, some of the variables observed, such as gender or age, respond to mode-specific patterns of influence. Apart from this fact, the most notable discrepancy is that for turnout and conventional participation in general the significant coefficients go in the expected direction, that is, socially advantaged citizens are more prone to participate. Differences in participation in demonstrations are, on the contrary, less shaped by structural factors. Social class, employment situation, and noncitizenship or minority status do not play a role in predicting activity. This finding suggests that disadvantaged people also use this tool. In the case of demonstrations, the relationship between structural characteristics and activity is probably not homogeneous but varies across different contexts. This finding can be interpreted as giving some support to the “normalization” hypothesis (Norris, Walgrave, and van Aelst

2005). However, education is a solid predictor of attending demonstrations.

As a concluding remark, one important question is worth raising. It has been found that European countries may be closer to the socioeconomic bias in turnout found in the United States than is usually thought. The more privileged are voting to a greater extent than are less privileged citizens. This is contrast to recent statements such as “In Western Europe, then, there is no significant correlation between educational attainment and electoral turnout” (Topf 1995a: 48) or “education failed to predict turnout throughout most of Western Europe” (Norris 2002: 93). Because voting is the most central form of participating in politics, these kinds of inequalities are of special concern.

Notes

1. Being a member of an ethnic minority or not being a citizen of one’s country of residence are different situations that are not directly comparable. However, the frequency of these characteristics in the population and the specific characteristics of ethnic minorities and immigrants vary markedly across countries, which makes cross-national analysis difficult. Here, it is understood that the fact of being a minority—because of either ethnicity or migration—implies similar kinds of disadvantages that can be politically relevant. For the analysis of turnout, only members of ethnic minorities who are eligible to vote are included. On the other hand, citizens of developed countries are not included in this category and are omitted from the analysis.

2. The European Social Survey is distributed by the Norwegian Social Science Data Service. For a full description of the data set, see www.europeansocialsurvey.org.

3. The largest correlation coefficients (>0.3) are those between gender and nonmanual social class (-0.37); age and having an unlimited contract (-0.56); age and being inactive (0.67); years of education and income (0.43), being member of the service social class (0.56), or a nonqualified manual worker (-0.34); and income and service class (0.35). See also Appendix 1.

4. Country dummies have not been included for two reasons. First, it is atheoretical because we do not have well-developed hypotheses about which country characteristics (e.g., institutions, socioeconomic development) determine the size of the gaps. Second, the choice of the country of reference is very problematic. Often, the frequency of participatory activity is skewed toward the maximum and minimum values. The transformation of the log odds of doing an activity results in a very small real predicted change if the participation rate is close to the 100 percent or the 0 percent level of participation. On the contrary, the effect of the same coefficient is much larger if the participation rate is close to 50 percent. In other words, the substantive interpretation of the results varies widely depending on which country is the reference category.

5. The reason for observing single activities instead of additive indexes is that there are limited indicators of political participation in the second wave of the European Social Survey and that the underlying patterns observed among them vary between countries. The latter is particularly true in Eastern countries.

6. The operationalization of social class is elaborated by Håkon Leiulfssrud and is available at www.europeansocialsurvey.org. The whole household’s social class is assigned to each respondent.

References

- Anduiza Perea, E. 1999. “¿Individuos o sistemas? Las razones de la abstención en Europa Occidental!” [Individuals or Systems? Reasons for Abstention in Western

- Europe]. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Siglo Veintiuno de España Editores.
- Barnes, S.H., and M. Kaase. 1979. *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Brady, H.E.; S. Verba; and K.L. Schlozman. 1995. "Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation." *American Political Science Review* 89, no. 2: 271–94.
- Burns, N.; K.L. Schlozman; and S. Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Caul, M.C. 2005. "Rising Political Inequality in Established Democracies: Mobilization, Socioeconomic Status and Voter Turnout, 1960s to 2000." Paper presented at the 2005 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September 1–4.
- Clark, T.N., and S.M. Lipset. 1991. "Are Social Classes Dying?" *International Sociology* 6, no. 4: 397–410.
- . 2001. *The Breakdown of Class Politics: A Debate on Post-Industrial Stratification*. London: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Dalton, R.J. 2002. *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. 3d ed. New York/London: Chatham House/Seven Bridges Press.
- Diehl, C., and M. Blohm. 2001. "Apathy, Adaptation or Ethnic Mobilisation? On the Political Attitudes of an Excluded Group." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27, no. 3: 401–20.
- Gurr, T. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Jacobs, L.R., and T. Skocpol. 2005. *Inequality and American Democracy: What We Know and What We Need to Learn*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Jacobs, D., and J. Tillie. 2004. "Introduction: Social Capital and Political Integration of Migrants." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30, no. 3: 419–27.
- Jowell, R., and the Central Co-ordinating Team. 2005. *European Social Survey 2004/2005: Technical Report*. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University.
- Leighley, J.E., and A. Vedlitz. 1999. "Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations." *Journal of Politics* 61, no. 4: 1092–114.
- Lijphart, A. 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma." *American Political Science Review* 91, no. 1: 1–14.
- Manza, J.; M. Hout; and C. Brooks. 1995. "Class Voting in Capitalist Democracies Since World War II: Dealignment, Realignment, or Trendless Fluctuation?" *Annual Review of Sociology* 21: 137–62.
- Marsh, A., and M. Kaase. 1979. "Background of Political Action." In *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*, ed. S.H. Barnes and M. Kaase, 97–136. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Micheletti, M. 2003. *Political Virtue and Shopping: Individuals, Consumerism, and Collective Action*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Micheletti, M.; A. Follesdal; and D. Stolle. 2004. *Politics, Products, and Markets: Exploring Political Consumerism Past and Present*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- Milbrath, L.W., and M.L. Goel. 1977. *Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?* 2d ed. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Morales, Laura. 2004. *Institutions, Mobilization and Political Participation: Political*

- Membership in Western Countries*. Madrid: Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones.
- Nie, N.H.; J. Junn; and K. Stehlik-Barry. 1996. *Education and Democratic Citizenship in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Norris, P. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Norris, P.; S. Walgrave; and P. van Aelst. 2005. "Who Demonstrates? Antistate Rebels, Conventional Participants, or Everyone?" *Comparative Politics* 37, no. 2: 189–205.
- Oppenheim, E. 1995. *Voting Behavior in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Electoral Participation and Party Choice*. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.
- Parry, G.; G. Moyser; and N. Day. 1992. *Political Participation and Democracy in Britain*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Polavieja, J. 2003. *Estables y precarios: Desregularización laboral y estratificación social en España* [Stability and Instability: Labor Deregulation and Social Stratification in Spain]. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
- Rosenstone, S.J. 1982. "Economic Adversity and Voter Turnout." *American Journal of Political Science* 26, no. 1: 25–46.
- Rosenstone, S.J., and J.M. Hansen. 1993. *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America*. New York: Macmillan.
- Schlozman, K.L.; S. Verba; and H.E. Brady. 1999. "Civic Participation and the Equality Problem." In *Civic Engagement in American Democracy*, ed. Theda Skocpol and Morris Fiorina, 427–59. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Skocpol, T. 2004. "Voice and Inequality: The Transformation of American Civic Democracy." *Perspectives on Politics* 2, no. 1: 3–20.
- Stoop, I.; R. Jowell; and P. Mohler. 2002. "The European Social Survey: One Survey in Two Dozen Countries." Paper presented at the International Conference on Improving Surveys, Copenhagen, August 25–28.
- Topf, R. 1995a. "Electoral Participation." In *Citizens and the State*, ed. H. Klingemann and D. Fuchs, 27–51. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 1995b. "Beyond Electoral Participation." In *Citizens and the State*, ed. H. Klingemann and D. Fuchs, 52–91. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Uhlener, C.J.; B.E. Cain; and D.R. Kiewiet. 1989. "Political Participation of Ethnic minorities in the 1980s." *Political Behavior* 11, no. 3: 195–231.
- van Aelst, P., and S. Walgrave. 2001. "Who Is That (Wo)man in the Street? From the Normalisation of Protest to the Normalisation of the Protester." *European Journal of Political Research* 39, no. 4: 461–86.
- Verba, S. 1996. "The Citizen as Respondent: Sample Surveys and American Democracy Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1995." *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 1: 1–7.
- . 2004. "Would the Dream of Political Equality Turn Out to Be a Nightmare?" *Perspectives on Politics* 1, no. 4: 663–79.
- Verba, S., and N.H. Nie. 1972. *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Verba, S.; N.H. Nie; and J. Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Verba, S.; K.L. Schlozman; and H.E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Wolfinger, R.E., and S.J. Rosenstone. 1980. *Who Votes?* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Appendix 1

Correlation Matrix Between the Independent Variables

	Gender	Age	Education	Income	Owners	Services	Non-manual	Manual qualified	Manual non-qualified	Unlimited	Temporary	Unemployed	In-active	Minority non-citizen
Gender	1.000													
Age	-0.023	1.000												
Education			1.000											
in years	-0.236	-0.030	0.434	1.000										
Income	0.026	-0.035	0.116	0.353	1.000									
Owners	0.053	0.046	0.563	0.054	0.082	1.000								
Services	-0.122	0.034	-0.087	0.077	-0.097	0.002	1.000							
Nonmanual	0.369	-0.118	-0.087	0.054	0.028	-0.050	0.038	1.000						
Manual									1.000					
qualified	-0.255	0.029	-0.127	-0.082	—	—	—	—	—	1.000				
Manual											1.000			
nonqualified	-0.015	0.027	-0.344	-0.251	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.000		
Unlimited	0.045	-0.563	-0.001	0.077	-0.097	0.002	0.186	-0.036	-0.034	1.000				
Temporary	0.020	-0.236	0.015	-0.027	-0.030	-0.008	0.033	-0.011	0.015	—	1.000			
Unemployed	0.013	-0.246	-0.024	-0.089	-0.028	-0.050	0.038	-0.008	0.042	—	—	1.000		
Inactive	-0.052	0.675	0.004	-0.030	0.108	0.019	-0.194	0.039	0.012	—	—	—	1.000	
Minority, noncitizen	0.011	-0.204	-0.034	-0.003	-0.022	-0.024	0.017	-0.012	0.027	0.107	0.063	0.099	-0.152	1.000

Notes: In italics > 0.300; — = mutually exclusive categories.

Copyright of International Journal of Sociology is the property of M.E. Sharpe Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.